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Abstract
The process of opinion formation through synthesis and
contrast of different viewpoints has been the subject
of many studies in economics and social sciences. To-
day, this process manifests itself also in online social
networks and social media. The key characteristic of
successful promotion campaigns is that they take into
consideration such opinion-formation dynamics in order
to create a overall favorable opinion about a specific in-
formation item, such as a person, a product, or an idea.
In this paper, we adopt a well-established model for
social-opinion dynamics and formalize the campaign-
design problem as the problem of identifying a set
of target individuals whose positive opinion about an
information item will maximize the overall positive
opinion for the item in the social network. We call
this problem Campaign. We study the complexity
of the Campaign problem, and design algorithms for
solving it. Our experiments on real data demonstrate
the efficiency and practical utility of our algorithms.
1 Introduction
Individuals who participate in social networks form
their opinions through synthesis and contrast of dif-
ferent viewpoints they encounter in their social circles.
Such processes manifest themselves more strongly in on-
line social networks and social media where opinions
and ideas propagate faster through virtual connections
between social-network individuals. Opinion dynam-
ics have been of considerable interest to marketing and
opinion-formation agencies, which are interested in rais-
ing public awareness on important issues (e.g., health,
social justice), or increasing the popularity of person or
an item (e.g., a presidential candidate, or a product).
Today, social-networking platforms and social me-
dia take up a significant amount of any promotion cam-
paign budget. It is not uncommon to see activist groups,
political parties, or corporations launching campaigns
primarily via Facebook or Twitter. Such campaigns in-
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terfere with the opinion-formation process by influenc-
ing the opinions of appropriately selected individuals,
such that the overall favorable opinion about the spe-
cific information item is strengthened.
The idea of leveraging social influence for market-
ing campaigns has been studied extensively in data min-
ing. Introduced by the work of Domingos and Richard-
son [20], and Kempe et al. [14] the problem of influence
maximization asks to identify the most influential indi-
viduals, whose adoption of a product or an action will
spread maximally in the social network. This line of
work employs probabilistic propagation models, such as
the independent-cascade or the linear-threshold model,
which specify how actions spread among the individuals
of the social network. At a high level, such propagation
models distinguish the individuals to either active or
inactive, and assume that active individuals influence
their neighbors to become active according to certain
probabilistic rules, so that activity spreads in the net-
work in a cascading manner.
In this paper, we are interested in the process of how
individuals form opinions, rather than how they adopt
products or actions. We find that models such as the
independent cascade and the linear threshold are not
appropriate for modeling the process of forming opin-
ions in social networks. First, opinions cannot be ac-
curately modeled by binary states, such as being either
active or inactive, but they can take continuous values
in an interval. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
the formation of opinions does not resemble a discrete
cascading process; it better resembles a social game in
which individuals constantly influence each other until
convergence to an equilibrium.
Accordingly, we adopt the opinion-formation model
of Friedkin and Johnsen [11], which assumes that each
node i of a social network G = (V,E) has an internal
opinion si and an expressed opinion zi. While the inter-
nal opinions of individuals are fixed and not amenable to
external influences, the expressed opinions can change
due to the influence from their neighbors. More specif-
ically, people change their expressed opinion zi so that
they minimize their social cost, which is defined as the
disagreement between their expressed opinion and the
expressed opinion of their social neighbors, and the di-
vergence between the expressed opinion and their true
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internal belief. It can be shown that the process of com-
puting expressed opinion values by repeated averaging
leads to a Nash equilibrium of the game where the util-
ities are the node social costs [3].
Armed with this opinion-formation model, we in-
troduce and study a problem similar to the influence-
maximization problem, introduced by Kempe et al. [14].
We consider a social network of individuals, each hold-
ing an opinion value about an information item. We
view an opinion as a numeric value between zero (neg-
ative) and one (positive). We then ask to identify k
individuals, so that once their expressed opinions be-
comes 1, the opinions of the rest of the nodes — at
an equilibrium state — are, on average, as positive as
possible. We call this problem Campaign.
Note that there is a fundamental qualitative differ-
ence between our framework and existing work on in-
fluence maximization: In contrast to other models used
in influence-maximization literature, our work views the
nodes as rational individuals who wish to optimize their
own objectives. Thus, we assume that the opinions of
individuals get formed through best-response dynamics
of a social game, which in turn is inspired by classi-
cal opinion-dynamics models studied extensively in eco-
nomics [2, 6, 7, 12, 13].
Furthermore, from a technical point of view, the
maximization problem that results from our framework
requires a completely different toolbox of techniques
than the standard influence-maximization problem. To
this end, we exploit an interesting connection between
our problem and absorbing random walks in order to
establish our technical results, including the complexity
and the approximability of the problem. Interestingly,
as with the influence-maximization problem, we show
that the objective function of the Campaign problem
is submodular, and thus, it can be approximated within
factor (1− 1e ) using a greedy algorithm.
In addition, motivated by the properties of the
greedy algorithm, we propose scalable heuristics that
can handle large datasets. Our experiments show that
in practice the heuristics have performance comparable
to the greedy algorithm, and that are scalable to very
large graphs. Finally, we discuss two natural variants
of the Campaign problem. Our discussion reveals a
surprising property of the opinion formation process on
undirected graphs: the average opinion of the network
depends only on the internal opinions of the individuals
and not on the network structure.
2 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to formally
define and study the Campaign problem. However, our
work is related to a lot of existing work in economics,
sociology and computer science.
In his original work in 1974, DeGrout [6] was the
first to define a model where individuals organized in
a social network G = (V,E) have a starting opinion
(represented by a real value) which they update by
repeatedly adopting the average opinion of their friends.
This model and its variants, has been subject of recent
studies in social sciences and economics [2, 7, 11, 12,
13]. Most of these studies focus on identifying the
conditions under which such repeated-averaging models
converge to a consensus. In our work, we also adopt a
repeated averaging model. However, our focus is not
the characterization or the reachability of consensus.
In fact, we do not assume consensus is ever reached.
Rather, we assume that the individuals participating in
the network reach a stable point, where everyone has
crystallized a personal opinion. As has been recently
noted by social scientist Davide Krackhardt [16], studies
of such non-consensus states are much more realistic
since consensus states are rarely reached.
Key to our paper is the work by Bindel et al. [3].
In fact, we adopt the same opinion-dynamics model
as in [3], where individuals selfishly form opinions
to minimize their personal cost. However, Bindel et
al. focus on quantifying the social cost of this lack
of central coordination between individuals, i.e., the
price of anarchy, and they consider a network-design
problem with the objective of reducing the social cost
at equilibrium. Our work on the other hand, focuses on
designing a promotion campaign so that, at equilibrium,
the overall positive inclination towards a particular
opinion is maximized.
Recently, there has been a lot of work in the
computer-science literature on identifying a set of in-
dividuals to advertise an item (e.g., a product or an
idea) so that the spread of the item in the network is
maximized. Different assumptions about how informa-
tion items propagate in the network has led to a rich
literature of targeted-advertisement methods (e.g., see
[5, 9, 14, 20]). Although at a high level our work has
the same goal as all of these methods, there are also
important differences, as we have already discussed in
the introduction.
3 Problem definition
3.1 Preliminaries. We consider a social graph G =
(V,E) with n nodes and m edges. The nodes of the
graph represent people and the edges represent social
affinity between them. We refer to the members of
the social graph by letters such as i and j, and we
write (i, j) to denote the edges of the graph. With
each edge (i, j) we associate a weight wij ≥ 0, which
expresses the strength of the social affinity or influence
from person i to person j. We write N(i) to denote
the social neighborhood of person i, that is, N(i) = {j |
(i, j) ∈ E}. Unless explicitly mentioned, we do not
make an assumption whether the graph G is directed
or undirected; most of our results and our algorithms
carry over for both types of graphs. The directed-graph
model is more natural as in many real-world situations
the influence wij from person i to person j is not equal
to wji.
Following the framework of Bindel et al. [3] we as-
sume that person i has a persistent internal opinion si,
which remains unchanged from external influences. Per-
son i has also an expressed opinion zi, which depends
on their internal opinion si, as well as on the expressed
opinions of their social neighborhood N(i). The under-
lying assumption is that individuals form opinions that
combine their internal predisposition with the opinions
of those in their social circle.
We model the internal and external opinions si and
zi as real values in the interval [0, 1]. The convention
is that 0 denotes a negative opinion, and 1 a positive
opinion. The values in-between capture different shades
of positive and negative opinions. Given a set of
expressed opinion values for all the people in the social
graph, represented by an opinion vector z = (zi : i ∈
V ), and the vector of internal opinions s = (si : i ∈ V ),
we consider that the personal cost for individual i is
(3.1) ci(z) = (si − zi)2 +
∑
j∈N(i)
wij(zi − zj)2.
This cost models the fact that the expressed opinion zi
of an individual i is a “compromise” between their own
internal belief si and the opinions of their neighbors. As
the individual i forms an opinion zi, their internal opin-
ion si and the opinions zj of their neighbors j ∈ N(i)
may have different importance. The relative importance
of those opinions is captured by the weights wij .
Now assume that, as a result of social influence
and conflict resolution, every individual i is selfishly
minimizing their own cost ci(z). If the internal opinions
are persistent and cannot change (an assumption that
we carry throughout), minimizing the cost ci implies
changing the expressed opinion zi to the weighted
average among the internal opinion si and the expressed
opinions of the neighbors of i. In other words,
(3.2) zi =
si +
∑
j∈N(i) wijzj
1 +
∑
j∈N(i) wij
.
In fact, it can be shown that if every person i iteratively
updates their expressed opinion using Equation (3.2),
then the iterations converge to a unique Nash Equilib-
rium for the game with utilities of players expressed by
Equation (3.1). That is, the stationary vector of opin-
ions z is such that no node i has an incentive to change
their opinion to improve their cost ci.
3.2 Problem definition. The goal of a promotion
campaign is to improve the overall opinion about a
product, person, or idea in a social network. Given an
opinion vector z, we define the overall opinion g(z) as
g(z) =
n∑
i=1
zi,
which is also proportional to the average expressed
opinion of the individuals in G. The goal of a campaign
is to maximize g(z). Following the paradigm of Kempe
et al. [14], we assume that such a campaign relies on
selecting a set of target nodes T , which are going to be
convinced to change their expressed opinions to 1. For
the rest of the discussion, we will use g(z | T ) to denote
the overall opinion in the network, when vector z is the
Nash-equilibrium vector obtained under the constraint
that the expressed opinions of all nodes in T are fixed
to 1. Given this notation, we can define the Campaign
problem as follows.
Problem 1. (Campaign) Given a graph G = (V,E)
and an integer k, identify a set T of k nodes such that
fixing the expressed opinions of the nodes in T to 1,
maximizes the overall opinion g(z | T ).
We emphasize that fixing zi = 1 for all i ∈ T means
that Equation (3.2) is only applied for the zj ’s such that
j /∈ T , while for the nodes i ∈ T the values zi remain 1.
The definition of the Campaign problem reflects
our belief of what constitutes a feasible and effec-
tive campaign strategy. Expressed opinions are more
amenable to change, and have stronger effect on the
overall opinion in the social network. Thus, it is rea-
sonable for a campaign to target these opinions. We
note that other campaign strategies are also possible,
resulting in different problem definitions. For example,
one can define the problem where the campaign aims
at changing the fundamental beliefs of people by alter-
ing their internal opinions si. It is also conceivable to
ask whether it is possible to improve the overall opin-
ion g(z) by introducing a number of new edges in the
social graph, e.g., via a link-suggestion application. We
discuss both of these variants at the end of the paper.
It turns out that from the algorithmic point of view,
both these problems are relatively simple. For instance,
we can show that for undirected graphs, surprisingly, it
is not possible to improve the overall opinion g(z) by
introducing new edges in the graph.
3.3 Background. We now show the connection be-
tween computing the Nash-equilibrium opinion vector z
and a random walk on a graph with absorbing nodes.
This connection is essential in the analysis of the Cam-
paign problem.
Absorbing random walks: Let H = (X,R) be a
graph with a set of N nodes X, and a set of edges
R. The graph is also associated with the following
three N × N matrices: (i) the weight matrix W with
entries W (i, j) denoting the weight of the edges; (ii)
the degree matrix D, which is a diagonal matrix such
that D(i, i) =
∑N
j=1W (i, j); (iii) the transition matrix
P = D−1W , which is a row-stochastic matrix; P (i, j)
expresses the probability of moving from node i to node
j in a random walk on the graph H.
In such a random walk on the graph H, we say
that a node b ∈ X is an absorbing node, if the random
walk can only transition into that node, but not out
of it (and thus, the random walk is absorbed in node
b). Let B ⊆ X denote the set of all absorbing nodes
of the random walk. The set of the remaining nodes
U = X\B are non-absorbing, or transient nodes. Given
this partition of the states in X, the transition matrix
of this random walk can be written as follows:
P =
(
PUB PUU
I O
)
.
In the above equation, I is an (N − |U |) × (N − |U |)
identity matrix and O a matrix with all its entries equal
to 0; PUU is the |U | × |U | sub-matrix of P with the
transition probabilities between transient states; and
PUB is the |U |×|B| sub-matrix of P with the transition
probabilities from transient to absorbing states.
An important quantity of an absorbing random
walk is the expected number of visits to a transient
state j when starting from a transient state i before
being absorbed. The probability of transitioning from
i to j in exactly ` steps is the (i, j)-entry of the matrix
(PUU )
`
. Therefore, the probability that a random walk
starting from state i ends in j without being absorbed
is given by the (i, j) entry of the |U | × |U | matrix
F =
∞∑
`=0
(PUU )
`
= (1− PUU )−1 ,
which is known as the fundamental matrix of the
absorbing random walk. Finally, the matrix
QUB = F PUB
is an |U | × |B| matrix, with QUB(i, j) being the proba-
bility that a random walk which starts at transient state
i ends up being absorbed at state j ∈ B.
Assume that each absorbing node j ∈ B is associ-
ated with a fixed value bj . If a random walk starting
from transient node i ∈ U gets absorbed in an absorbing
node j ∈ B, then we assign to node i the value bj . The
probability of the random walk starting from node i to
be absorbed in j is QUB(i, j). Therefore, the expected
value of i is fi =
∑
j∈B QUB(i, j)bj . If fU is the vector
with the expected values for all i ∈ U , and fB keeps the
values {bj} for all j ∈ B, then we have that
(3.3) fU = QUBfB .
A fundamental observation, which highlights the
connection between our work and random walks with
absorbing states, is that the expected value fi of node
i ∈ U can be computed by repeatedly averaging the
values of the neighbors of i in the graph H. Therefore,
the computation of the Nash-Equilibrium opinion vector
z can be done using Equation (3.3) on an appropriately
constructed graph H. We discuss the construction of H
below. More details on absorbing walks can be found in
the excellent monograph of Doyle and Snell [8].
The augmented graph. We will now show how the
theory of absorbing random walks described above can
be leveraged for solving the Campaign problem. This
connection is achieved by performing a random walk
with absorbing states on an augmented graph H =
(X,R), whose construction we describe below.
Given a social network G = (V,E) where every edge
(i, j) ∈ E is associated with weight wij , we construct the
augmented graph H = (X,R) of G as follows:
(i) the set of vertices X of H is defined as X = V ∪V ,
where V is a set of n new nodes such that for each
node i ∈ V there is a copy σ(i) ∈ V ;
(ii) the set of edges R of H includes all the edges E of
G, plus a new set of edges between each node i ∈ V
and its copy σ(i) ∈ V . That is, R = E ∪ E, and
E = {(i, σ(i)) | i ∈ V };
(iii) the weights of all the new edges (i, σ(i)) ∈ R are set
to 1, i.e., W (i, σ(i)) = 1. For i, j ∈ V , the weight
of the edge (i, j) ∈ R is equal to the weight of the
corresponding edge in G, i.e., W (i, j) = wij .
Our main observation is that we can compute the
opinion vector z that corresponds to the Nash equi-
librium defined by Equation (3.1) by performing an
absorbing random walk on the graph H. In this random
walk, we set B = V and U = V , that is, we make
all copy nodes in V to be absorbing. We also set
fB = s, that is, we assign value si to each absorbing
node σ(i). The Nash-equilibrium opinion-vector z can
be computed using Equation (3.3), that is, z = QUBs.
The opinion zi =
∑
j∈B QUB(i, j)sj is the expected
internal opinion value at the node of absorption for a
random walk that starts from node i ∈ V . Given the
vector z we can compute the overall opinion g(z).
The Campaign problem can be naturally defined in
this setting. Selecting a set of nodes T is equivalent to
adding the nodes in T into the set of absorbing nodes B,
and assigning them value 1. That is, we have B = V ∪T
and U = V \ T . For the vector fB , we have fσ(i) = si
for all σ(i) ∈ V , and fj = 1 for all j ∈ T . We use
Equation (3.3) to compute vector z and using this z,
we can then compute the overall opinion g(z | T ).
Hence, the Campaign problem becomes the problem
of selecting a set of k nodes T ⊆ V to make absorbing
with value 1, such that g(z | T ) is maximized.
4 Problem complexity
In this section, we establish the complexity of the
Campaign problem by showing that it is an NP-hard
problem. We also discuss properties of the objective
function g(z | T ), which give rise to a constant-factor
approximation algorithm for the Campaign problem.
Theorem 4.1. Problem Campaign is NP-hard.
The proof of the theorem appears in the Ap-
pendix A. The proof relies on a reduction from
the Vertex Cover on Regular Graphs problem
(VCRG) [10].
Since the Campaign problem is NP-hard, we are
content with algorithms that approximate the optimal
solution in polynomial time. Fortunately, we can show
that the function g(z | T ) is monotone and submodular,
and thus a simple greedy heuristic yields a constant-
factor approximation to the optimal solution.
Theorem 4.2. The function g(z | T ) is monotone and
submodular.
Proof. We only give here a proof sketch. A detailed
proof is given in Appendix B. Recall that g(z | T ) =∑
i∈V zi. In the absorbing random walk interpretation
of the opinion formation process, we have shown that
the expressed opinion of node i is the expected opinion
value at the point of absorbtion for a random walk that
starts from node i. That is, zi =
∑
b∈B P (b | i)fb,
where B is the set of absorbing nodes, P (b | i) is the
probability of the random walk starting from node i
to be absorbed at node b, and fb the opinion value at
node b. When we add a node x to T , and hence to
the set B, some of the probability mass of the random
walk will be absorbed at x. Since x has the maximum
possible opinion value, fx = 1, if follows that zi can only
increase, and thus g(z | T ) is monotone. Furthermore,
the less competition there is for x (i.e., the smaller the
size of B), the more mass of the random walk will be
absorbed in x, and the larger the increase of g(z | T ).
Hence g(z | T ) is submodular.
5 Algorithms
5.1 Estimating the Nash-equilibrium vector z.
A central component in all the algorithms presented in
this section is the estimation of the the opinion function
g(z | T ). In Section 3.3, we have already discussed that
this can be done by evaluating Equation (3.3). For ap-
propriately defined sets U and B, this requires comput-
ing the matrix QUB = (1− PUU )−1 PUB . Hence, this
calculation involves a matrix inversion, which is very
inefficient. The reason is that despite the fact that the
social graph is typically sparse, matrix inversion does
not preserve sparseness. Thus, it may be too expensive
to even store the matrix QUB .
Instead, we resort to the power-iteration method
implied by Equation (3.2): at each iteration we update
the opinion zi of a node i ∈ V by averaging the
opinions of its neighbors j ∈ N(i) and its own internal
opinion si. During the iterations we do not update the
values of opinions that are fixed. This power-iteration
method is known to converge to the equilibrium vector
z, and it is highly scalable, since it only involves
multiplication of a sparse matrix with a vector. For
a graph with n nodes, m edges, and thus, average
degree d = 2mn , the algorithm requires O(nd) = O(m)
operations per iterations. Therefore, the overall running
time is O(mI), where I is the total number of iterations.
In our experiments we found the the method converges
in around 50-100 iterations, depending on the dataset.
5.2 Algorithms for the Campaign problem.
Our algorithms for the Campaign problem, include a
constant-factor approximation algorithm as well as sev-
eral efficient and effective heuristics.
The Greedy algorithm. It is known that the greedy
algorithm is a (1 − 1e )-approximation algorithm for
maximizing a submodular function h : Y → R subject
to cardinality constraints, i.e., finding a set A ⊆ Y that
maximizes h(A) such that |A| ≤ k [19]. Consequently,
the Greedy algorithm constructs the set T by adding
one node in each iteration. In the t-th iteration the
algorithm extends the set T (t−1) by adding the node i
that maximizes g(z | T (t)) when setting zi = 1.
The computational bottleneck of Greedy is due to
the fact that we need to compute the Nash-equilibrium
opinion vector z that results from setting zt = 1 for all
t ∈ T ∪ {j}, and we need to do such a computation
for all candidate nodes j ∈ V \ T . Overall, for a
solution T of size |T | = k Greedy needs to perform
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Figure 1: Measures of graph nodes plotted in order selected by the Greedy algorithm.
O(nk) computations of finding the optimal vector z.
As we saw, each of these computations is performed
by a power-iteration in time O(mI), yielding an overall
running time O(nmkI). Such a running time is super-
quadratic and therefore the algorithm is not scalable to
very large datasets.
One way to speedup the algorithm is by storing,
for each node that it is not yet selected, its marginal
improvement on the score, at the last time it was com-
puted. This speedup, which is commonly used in op-
timization problems with submodular functions [17], is
not adequate to make the greedy algorithm applicable
for large data, at least for the version of the algorithm
described here. The reason is that in the very first iter-
ation there is no pruning and therefore we need to make
O(n) power-iteration computations, yielding again a
quadratic algorithm. To overcome these scalability lim-
itations, we present a number of scalable heuristics.
5.3 Designing the heuristics. To characterize the
nodes selected by Greedy we execute the algorithm on
small datasets, and we compute a number of measures
for each node selected by Greedy. In particular, for
each node we compute measures such as its degree, the
average degree of its neighbors, the maximum degree of
its neighbors, the value of its internal opinion si, the
average value of si over its neighbors, and so on. Three
of the features with the most clear signal are shown
in Figure 1 for the karate club dataset (described in
detail in Section 6). We obtain similar behavior on all
the datasets we tried.
In Figure 1 we plot measures of nodes in the order
selected by the Greedy. A good measure would be
one that is monotonic with respect to this order. In
the first panel, we show the degree of a node in the
selection order of Greedy, and we see that Greedy tends
to select first high degree nodes. As shown in the
second panel, this dependence is even more clear for the
free degree, i.e., the number of neighbors that are not
already selected by Greedy. Finally, in the third panel
of Figure 1 we see the internal opinion si of nodes in the
order selected by the Greedy. We see that the Greedy
tends to select first nodes with low internal opinion.
There are a few exceptions of nodes with high internal
opinion si selected at the initial steps of greedy. Such
nodes are nodes with high degree, connected to many
nodes with small values of si.
Armed with intuition from this analysis we now
proceed to describe our heuristics.
The Degree algorithm. This algorithm simply sorts
the nodes of G = (V,E) in decreasing order of their in
degree and forms the set of target nodes T by picking
the top-k nodes of the ranking. The running time of
Degree is O(n log n), i.e., the time required for sorting.
The FreeDegree algorithm. This algorithm is a
“greedy” variant of Degree; FreeDegree forms the set
T iteratively by choosing at every iteration the node
with the highest free degree. The free degree of a node
is the sum of the weights of the edges that are incident
to it and are are connected to nodes not already in T .
When the set T consists of k nodes, the running time of
FreeDegree is O(kn).
The RWR algorithm. As we saw in Figure 1, a
good choice for nodes to be added in the solution
are not only the nodes of high degree but also the
nodes of small value of internal opinion si. The RWR
algorithm combines both of these features: selecting
nodes with high degree and with small si. This is done
by performing a random walk with restart (RWR), where
the probability of restarting at a node i is proportional
to ri = smax − si, where smax = maxi∈V si, and
ordering the nodes according to the resulting stationary
distribution. The intuition is that a random walk
favors high-degree nodes, and using the specific restart
probabilities favors nodes with low value of si.
For the restart probability, we use the parameter
α = 0.15, which has been established as a standard
parameter of the PageRank algorithm [4]. Making
one RWR computation can be achieved by the power-
iteration method, which similarly to computing the
optimal vector z, has running time O(mI). Therefore,
the overall running time of the algorithm for selecting a
set T of size k is O(mkI).
The Min-S and Min-Z algorithms. The Min-S
algorithm simply selects the k nodes with the smallest
value si. This heuristic is motivated by the observation
that the Greedy algorithm tends to select nodes with
small value si. For completeness, we also experiment
with the Min-Z algorithm, which greedily selects and
add in the solution set T the node that at the current
iteration has the smallest value of expressed opinion zi.
6 Experimental evaluation
The objective of our experiments is to compare the
proposed heuristics against Greedy, the algorithm with
the approximation guarantee, and demonstrate their
scalability.
6.1 Small networks. We experiment with a number
of publicly available small networks.1 We evaluate our
algorithms by reporting the value of the objective func-
tion g(z) as a function of the solution set size |T | = k.
Our results for three small networks are shown in Fig-
ure 2. The datasets shown in the figure are the follow-
ing: (i) karate club: a social network of friendships
between 34 members of a karate club at a US university
in the 1970s [21]; (ii) les miserables: co-appearance
network of characters in the novel Les Miserables [15];
and (iii) dolphins: an undirected social network of fre-
quent associations between 62 dolphins [18]. For this set
of experiments we set the internal opinions si to be a
uniformly-sampled value in [0, 1].
We see that the difference between all the algo-
rithms is relatively small but their relative performance
is consistent. The Greedy algorithm achieves the best
results, while the three heuristics, Degree, FreeDegree,
and RWR come close together. Min-S and Min-Z have
the poorest performance, even though for larger val-
ues of k they improve and slightly outperform some of
the heuristics. Between the two, Min-S performs best,
outperforming Min-Z, especially for small values of k.
Both of those trends are expected: the three heuris-
tics Degree, FreeDegree, and RWR, are better motivated
than Min-S, which in turn, is better motivated than
Min-Z.
We obtain similar results for other small networks,
although we do not provide the plots for lack of space.
1www-personal.umich.edu/˜mejn/netdata/
6.2 Bibliographic datasets: A “data mining”
campaign. We also evaluate our algorithms on two
large social networks, derived from bibliographic data.
The first dataset, bibsonomy, is extracted from
bibsonomy [1], a social-bookmarking and publication-
sharing system. From the available data, we extract a
social graph of 45 329 nodes representing authors and
149 895 edges representing co-authorship relations. For
each author we also keep the set of tags that have been
used for the papers of that author.
The second dataset, dblp, is also a co-authorship
graph among computer scientists extracted from the
dblp site.2 The dataset is a large graph containing
635 585 nodes and 1 423 716 edges. Again, for each
author we keep the set of terms they have been used
in the titles of the papers they have co-authored.
In this experiment, we generate the internal opinion
vectors by identifying keywords related to data mining
(e.g., we picked data, mining, social, networks, graph,
clustering, learning, and community). For each author
i ∈ V we then set si to be the fraction of the above
keywords present in his set of terms. This setting
corresponds to a hypothetical scenario of designing a
campaign to promote the “data mining” topic among
all computer-science researchers.
The results of the heuristics for the two datasets
are shown in Figure 3. For the bibsonomy dataset
(left), there is a clear distinction between the three
heuristics; RWR clearly performs better than both Degree
and FreeDegree. This superior performance of RWR
is expected as this algorithm takes into account both
the degrees and the values of the internal opinions si.
Also the better performance of FreeDegree compared
with the performance of Degree is consistent with the
results obtained for smaller networks. On the other
hand, on the dblp dataset (right part of Figure 3) the
behavior of the three heuristics is more surprisingly, as
all three perform almost identical. Finally, for both
datasets, the difference of the three best heuristics
Degree, FreeDegree, and RWR with the other two
heuristics, Min-S and Min-Z is more pronounced. In
fact, the performance of Min-S and Min-Z is very poor.
We investigate the difference on the relative perfor-
mance of the best three heuristics, Degree, FreeDegree,
and RWR, on the two datasets by plotting the degrees of
the nodes versus their si value. This is shown in Fig-
ure 4. Recall that our intuition for selecting nodes that
is to choose nodes that have large degree and small value
of si. Figure 4 demonstrates that in the dblp dataset,
large degree correlates well with small si values, while
this is not the case for the bibsonomy dataset. There-
2www.informatik.uni-trier.de/˜ley/db/
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Figure 2: Performance of the algorithms on small networks.
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Figure 3: Performance of the algorithms on the bibsonomy and dblp networks for the topic “data mining”.
Figure 4: Scatter plot of degrees vs. internal opinion
values si in the two datasets, bibsonomy and dblp.
fore, for dblp all three heuristics pick high-degree nodes,
which makes their performance almost identical.
7 Problem variants
The Campaign problem we studied in this paper fo-
cuses on campaigns that aim to alter the expressed opin-
ions of individuals. However, other campaign strategies
are also possible. For example one could aim at altering
the internal opinions of individuals such that the over-
all opinion is improved as much as possible. Formally,
the goal would be to select a set of nodes S, which are
going to be convinced to change their internal opinions
si to 1, such that the resulting overall opinion g(z | S)
is maximized. We call this problem the i-Campaign
problem. The difference between the Campaign and i-
Campaign problems is that in the former we are asking
to fix the expressed opinions zi for k individuals, while
in the latter we are asking to fix the internal opinions
si. Even though the difference is seemingly small, the
problems are computationally very different.
Algorithmically, the problem of selecting S individ-
uals to change their internal opinions, so that we max-
imize g(z | S) is much simpler. In fact, we can show
that for an undirected social graph G = (V,E), where
each node i ∈ V has internal opinion si and expressed
opinion zi, the following invariant holds, independently
of the structure of the graph (the set of edges E):
(7.4) g(z) =
∑
i∈V
zi =
∑
i∈V
si.
Consequently, the goal of maximizing g(z) by modifying
k values si can be simply achieved by selecting the k
smallest values si and setting them to 1. We note that
the above observation does not hold once the expressed
opinions of some individuals are fixed, as is the case in
the Campaign problem. The proof of the invariant, and
its implications are discussed in the Appendix C.
The graph invariant has obvious implications for
the other variant of the campaign problem, where we
seek to maximize g(z) by adding or removing edges
to the graph. From Equation (7.4) it follows that
for undirected social graphs this problem variant is
meaningless; the overall opinion g(z) does not depend
on the structure of the graph. This observation has
important implications for opinion formation on social
networks. It shows that although the network structure
has an effect on the individual opinions of network
participants, it does not affect the average opinion in the
network. For the campaign problem, this says that you
cannot create more goodwill by altering the network.
For the study of social dynamics, this implies that the
collective wisdom of the crowd remains unaffected by
the social connections between individuals.
8 Conclusions
We considered a setting where opinions of individuals
in a social network evolve through processes of social
dynamics, reaching a Nash equilibrium. Adopting a
standard social and economic model of such dynamics
we addressed the following natural question: given
a social network of individuals who have their own
internal opinions about an information item, which are
the individuals that need to be convinced to adopt
a positive opinion so that in the equilibrium state,
the network (as a whole) has the maximum positive
opinion about the item? We studied the computational
complexity of this problem and proposed algorithms for
solving them exactly or approximately. Our theoretical
analysis and the algorithm design relied on a connection
between opinion dynamics and random walks with
absorbing states. Our experimental evaluation on real
datasets demonstrated the efficacy of our algorithms
and the effect of the structural characteristics of the
underlying social networks on their performance.
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A Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. We prove the theorem by reducing an instance
of the Vertex Cover on Regular Graphs problem
(VCRG) [10] to an instance of the decision version of the
Campaign problem. We remind that a graph is called
regular if all its nodes have the same degree.
Given a regular graph GV C = (VV C , EV C) and an
integer K the VCRG problem asks whether there exists
a set of nodes Y ⊆ VV C such that |Y | ≤ K and Y is
a vertex cover (i.e., for every (i, j) ∈ EV C it is i ∈ Y
or j ∈ Y ).
An instance of the decision version of the Cam-
paign problem consists of a social graph G = (V,E),
internal opinions s, an integer k and a number θ. The
solution to the decision version is “yes” iff there exists
a set T ⊆ V such that |T | ≤ k and g(z | T ) ≥ θ.
Given an instance of the VCRG problem, we will
construct an instance of the decision version of Cam-
paign by setting G = (V,E) to be equal to GV C =
(VV C , EV C), si = 0 for every i ∈ V , k = K and
θ = (n−k) dd+1 . Then, we show that T ⊆ V is a solution
to the Campaign problem with value g(z | T ) ≥ θ if
and only if T is a vertex cover of the input instance of
VCRG.
In order to show this, we use the absorbing random
walk interpretation of the Campaign problem. Recall
that by the definition of the Campaign problem, every
node i ∈ T becomes an absorbing node with value
zi = 1. For every other node j /∈ T we compute a value
zj , which is the expected value at the absorption point
of a random walk that starts from j. Since si = 0 for all
i ∈ V and zi = 1 for all i ∈ T , the value zj represents
the probability that the random walk starting from j
will be absorbed in some node in T .
Now suppose that T is a vertex cover for GV C .
Then, for every non-absorbing vertex j ∈ V \ T , for
each one of the d edges (j, i) ∈ E incident on j, it must
be that i ∈ T ; otherwise edge (j, i) is not covered, and
T is not a vertex cover. Therefore, in the augmented
graph H, node j is connected to d nodes in T , and to
node σj , all of them absorbing. A random walk starting
from j will be absorbed and converge in a single step.
The probability of it being absorbed in a node in T is
zj =
d
d+1 . There are n − k nodes in V \ T , therefore,
g(z | T ) = (n− k) dd+1 .
If T is not a vertex cover for GV C , then there is an
edge (j, `) ∈ E, such that j, ` 6∈ T . As we noted before,
zj is the probability of being absorbed in some node in
T . The transition probability of the edge (j, σj) is
1
d+1 ,
therefore, node j has probability at least 1d+1 of being
absorbed in σj . Since there is a path from j to σ` with
non-zero probability, the probability of j being absorbed
in node σ` is strictly greater than zero. Therefore, the
probability of being absorbed in some node not in T is
strictly greater than 1d+1 , and thus zj <
d
d+1 . It follows
that g(z | T ) < (n− k) dd+1 .
B Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof. Recall that g(z | T ) = ∑i∈V zi, where the values
of vector z are computed using Equation (3.3). As we
have already described, we can view the computation
of the vector z as performing a random walk with
absorbing nodes on the augmented graph H = (V ∪
V ,E∪E). Assume that B is the set of absorbing nodes,
and that each b ∈ B is associated with value fb. Let
PB(b | i) be the probability that a random walk that
starts from i gets absorbed at node b, when the set of
absorbing nodes is B. The expressed opinion of node
i /∈ B is
zi =
∑
b∈B
PB(b | i)fb.
Since this value depends on the set B, we will write
z(i | B) to denote the value of zi when the set of
absorbing nodes is B.
Initially, the set of absorbing nodes is B = V and
fb = sb for all b ∈ B. When we select a subset of nodes
T ⊆ V such that their expressed opinions are fixed to 1,
we have that B = V ∪T , fb = sb for all b ∈ V and fb = 1
for all b ∈ T . Since the set of nodes V is always part of
the set B, and the parameter that we are interested in
for this proof is the target set of nodes T , we will use
z(i | T ) to denote z(i | B) where B = V ∪ T . We thus
have
g(z | T ) =
∑
i∈V
z(i | T ).
Note that the summation is over all nodes in V including
the nodes in T . If i ∈ T , then PB(i | i) = 1, and
PB(j | i) = 0 for all j 6= i. Therefore, z(i | T ) = 1 for
all i ∈ T .
We now make the following key observation. Let j
be a non-absorbing node in V \ T . We have that
z(i | T ) =
∑
b∈B
(
PB∪{j}(b | i) + PB∪{j}(j | i)PB(b | j)
)
fb.
The equation above follows from the observation that we
can express the probability of a random walk starting
from i to be absorbed in some node b ∈ B as the sum
of two terms: (i) the probability PB∪{j}(b | i) that the
random walk is absorbed in b, while avoiding passing
through j (thus we add j in the absorbing set); (ii)
the probability PB∪{j}(j | i) that the random walk
is absorbed in j while avoiding the nodes in B (that
is, the probability of all paths that go from i to j of
arbitrary length, without passing through j or B), times
the probability PB(b | j) of starting a new random walk
from j and getting absorbed in b (being able to revisit
j and any node in V \ T ).
If we add node j into the set T we have that
z(i | T ∪ {j})− z(i | T )
=
∑
b∈B∪{j}
PB∪{j}(b | i)fb
−
∑
b∈B
(
PB∪{j}(b | i) + PB∪{j}(j | i)PB(b | j)
)
fb
= PB∪{j}(j | i)
(
1−
∑
b∈B
PB(b | j)fb
)
= PB∪{j}(j | i) (1− z(j | T )) ≥ 0.
Hence,
∆g(T, j) = (1− z(j | T ))
∑
i∈V
PB∪{j}(j | i) ≥ 0.
Therefore, we can conclude that function g(z | T ) is
monotone with respect to the set of target nodes T .
We now need to show that g(z | T ) is submodular,
that is for any T, T ′ such that T ⊆ T ′, and for any node
j ∈ V , we have that ∆g(T ′, j) − ∆g(T, j) ≤ 0. For
this we will use two random walks: one with absorbing
states B = V ∪ T and the other with absorbing states
B′ = V ∪ T ′. Following reasoning and notation similar
to the one we used for monotonicity we have that
∆g(T ′, j)−∆g(T, j)
= (1− z(j | T ′))
∑
i∈V
PB′∪{j}(j | i)
− (1− z(j | T ))
∑
i∈V
PB∪{j}(j | i).
From the monotonicity property we have that
1− z(j | T ′) ≤ 1− z(j | T ).
Also, as the number of absorbing nodes increases, the
probability of being absorbed in a specific node j
decreases, since the probability of the random walk to
be absorbed in a node other than j increases. Therefore,
we also have that
PB′∪{j}(j | i) ≤ PB∪{j}(j | i).
Combining these last two observations we conclude that
∆g(T ′, j)−∆g(T, j) ≤ 0 which shows that the function
is submodular.
C Graph invariants
In this section we prove a graph invariant related to
the sum of the values zi and si. This invariant has
repercussions in the following scenarios:
(i) maximize g(z) by modifying only the internal opin-
ions si of the users (problem i-Campaign in Sec-
tion 7); and
(ii) maximize g(z) by adding edges in the social graph,
for instance, recommend friendships or certain ac-
counts for users to connect and follow.
We prove the invariant in a slightly more general
setting than the one we consider in the paper. We then
formulate the more special case of the invariant for our
exact problem setting, and we discuss its implications
in the above-mentioned scenarios (i) and (ii).
Consider an undirected graph G = (V,E). We use
wij to denote the weight of edge (i, j) and Wi to denote
the total weight of all edges incident on node i. We
assume that the vertices in V are partitioned in two
sets U and B. The nodes in B are absorbing nodes for
the random walk. Each node j ∈ B is associated with a
value fj . The value fj can be either the internal opinion
of node j (in which case fj = sj), or the fixed expressed
opinion of node j (in which case fj = 1). For each node
i ∈ U we will compute a value zi which is the expected
value at the node of absorption for a random walk that
starts from node i, as given by Equation (3.3).
We further make the assumption that the set of
absorbing nodes can be partitioned into |U | disjoint
subsets {B(i)}, one for each node i ∈ U , such that
the nodes in B(i) are connected only with the node i.
We can make this assumption without loss of generality,
since in the case that a node j ∈ B is connected to k
nodes {i1, ..., ik} in U , we can create k copies of j, each
with value fj , and connect each copy with a single node
in U with an edge of the same weight, while removing
the original node j from the graph. In the resulting
graph the zi values computed by the absorbing random
walk are the same as in the original graph.
To introduce some additional notation let EU de-
note the set of edges between non-absorbing nodes, and
let EB denote the set of edges between nodes in U and
in B. Note that by the construction above there are no
edges between the nodes in B. Such edges would not
have any effect anyway, since the nodes in B are ab-
sorbing. Given a node i ∈ U , let N(i) denote the set of
neighbors of i, let U(i) denote the set of non-absorbing
neighbors of i, and let B(i) denote the set of absorbing
neighbors of i.
From the definition of the absorbing random walk
we have that
zi =
1
Wi
∑
j:j∈B(i)
wijfj +
1
Wi
∑
j:j∈U(i)
wijzj ,
and thus
Wizi =
∑
j:j∈B(i)
wijfj +
∑
j:j∈U(i)
wijzj .
Summing over all i ∈ U we get∑
i∈U
Wizi =
∑
i∈U
∑
j:j∈B(i)
wijfj +
∑
i∈U
∑
j:j∈U(i)
wijzj
=
∑
(i,j)∈EB
wijfj +
∑
(i,j)∈EU
wij (zj + zi) .(C.1)
The left-hand side can also be written as:∑
i∈U
Wizi =
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈N(i)
wijzi
=
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U(i)
wijzi +
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈B(i)
wijzi
=
∑
(i,j)∈EU
wij (zj + zi) +
∑
(i,j)∈EB
wijzi.(C.2)
By Equations (C.1) and (C.2) we obtain
(C.3)
∑
(i,j)∈EB
wij (zi − fj) = 0.
Equation (C.3) is the most general form of our invariant.
The equation relates the values of zi and fj via the
weights wij across the edges EB , i.e., only the edges
between absorbing and non-absorbing nodes. The set
of edges EU between the non-absorbing nodes does not
play any role.
We now consider the special case in which Equa-
tion (C.3) is applied to graphs considered in this paper,
that is, in augmented graphs of type H = (V ∪V ,E∪E),
as defined in Section 3. In that case, each node i ∈ V
is connected to a single absorbing node σ(i) ∈ V ,
which has value fσ(i) = si. Furthermore, for each edge
(i, j) ∈ E, we have wij = w > 0, namely, all edges to
absorbing nodes have the same weight. In this case, the
invariant becomes
(7.4) g(z) =
∑
i∈V
zi =
∑
i∈V
si.
As already discussed in Section 7, Equation (7.4) has
the following implications.
(i) Regarding the problem i-Campaign, that is, when
we ask to maximize g(z) by modifying only the
internal opinion values si, it is easy to see that
the maximum increase occurs when selecting the k
smallest values si and setting them to 1. This ob-
servation motivates the algorithm Min-S described
in Section 5.
(ii) Consider the following problem: We want to maxi-
mize g(z) by only adding or removing edges in the
social graph and without modifying any of the val-
ues si or zi. Equations (C.3) and (7.4) provide
an expression for g(z) that is independent on the
structure of the graph defined by the edges in EU ,
and thus, show that it is not possible to change
g(z) by adding or removing edges.
